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Abstract
How should the contingent liabilities of a sovereign be treated
in a general restructuring of the debts of that sovereign? This question has
played only a minor role in past sovereign debt restructurings because the
size of such contingent liabilities has in most cases been small. In recent
years, however, slathering government guarantees on third party debt has
become the tool of choice for many countries in their efforts to quell an
incipient panic in their financial markets. Some of those sovereigns are now,
or may soon be, in the position of needing to restructure their debts. Ignoring
large contingent liabilities in a sovereign debt restructuring may plant a land
mine on the road to debt sustainability once the restructuring closes. That
said, the answers to the questions of whether and how to restructure
contingent liabilities are not obvious. Is the restructurer to assume that
some, all or none of those contingent liabilities will eventually wind up as
direct claims against the sovereign? Even if the underlying instrument can
be successfully restructured, the guarantee will typically stand as an
independent obligation of the guarantor that will require separate treatment in
the restructuring.
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How should the contingent liabilities of sovereigns (like
government guarantees of the debts of State-owned enterprises or even
private sector entities) be treated in a general restructuring of the debt of that
sovereign? This question has played only a minor role in the sovereign debt
restructurings of the last thirty years because the aggregate size of such
contingent liabilities -- in comparison to the overall debt stocks -- has in most
cases been very small.2 Slathering explicit government guarantees on third
party obligations, however, has recently become the tool of choice for many
countries in their efforts to quell an incipient panic in their financial markets.3
In addition, implicit government guarantees (the warm-arm-wrapped-overthe-shoulder; the wink; the nod; the unvoiced “all will be well in the end”
glance in the direction of the creditors) are now ubiquitous. Systemically
important financial institutions, state-owned or sponsored enterprises and
sub-sovereign political units may all borrow under the shadow of an implicit
sovereign guarantee. Inevitably, some of those sovereigns will need to
restructure their own debts one day and this component of their balance
sheets, or perhaps better said their off balance sheets, will need to be
addressed.
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Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP (New York) and Duke University School of Law,
respectively. For comments, thanks to Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, Carlos Esposito, Anna
Gelpern, Yuefen Li, Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, and Ignacio Tirado.
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The primary treatises that address sovereign restructurings devote little attention to the
matter of how to restructure sovereign guarantees. See, e.g., Mauro Megliani, SOVEREIGN
DEBT: GENESIS-RESTRUCTURING- LITIGATION (2012 draft; on file with authors); Rodrigo
Olivares-Caminal, LEGAL ASPECTS OF SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING (2010); Philip R.
Wood, INTERNATIONAL BONDS, LOANS, GUARANTEES, LEGAL OPINIONS (2007).
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Our primary source for data on this topic is a 2012 Report by Houlihan Lokey, available at
the website of the Institute for International Finance (http://www.iif.com/events/recent/); see
also Dalvinder Singh & John Raymond Labrosse, Developing a Framework for Effective
Financial Crisis Management, 2 OECD J. (2012) (reporting data on the increase in
contingent liabilities in the EU as a function of the 2007 financial crisis).
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This problem is not limited to sovereigns. States, provinces
and municipalities can also issue guarantees, often with little or no public
awareness that the local taxpayer’s credit has been engaged to repay the
debt until it is too late.4
The Motivations
The traditional motivation for issuing a sovereign guarantee is
to allow the beneficiary to piggy-back on the credit standing of the sovereign.
Entities that could not by themselves borrow in the credit market, or a project
that would not, on a stand-alone basis, have been bankable, are thus given
access to financing at tolerably low interest rates. The alternatives for the
sovereign often boil down to two -- finance the enterprise/project through a
sovereign borrowing followed by a relending to the enterprise/project, or
wrap a sovereign guarantee around a direct borrowing by the debtor. The
former places the liability squarely on the shoulders and the balance sheet of
the sovereign, driving up debt-to-GDP ratios and requiring compliance with
legal restrictions (such a statutory debt ceilings) on sovereign borrowing.
The latter can often be accomplished off-balance sheet and outside the
ambit of legal restrictions.
The dangers of unrestricted sovereign guarantees, and the
need for greater transparency in governmental accounting for these
arrangements, are gradually receiving more attention. UNCTAD’s recently
issued Principles on Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing
expressly address the problem. Principle 11 states:
Disclosure and publication
Relevant terms and conditions of a financing agreement should
be disclosed by the sovereign borrower, be universally
available, and be freely accessible in a timely manner through
online means to all stakeholders, including citizens. Sovereign
debtors have a responsibility to disclose complete and accurate
information on their economic and financial situation that
conforms to standardized reporting requirements and is
relevant to their debt situation. Governments should respond
openly to requests for related information from relevant parties.
4

See Mary William Walsh, Crushed by Promises -- Bonds Arranged in Obscurity Return to
Haunt Taxpayers, N.Y. TIMES, B1, B6, June 26, 2012:
The “full faith and taxing power” of communities, a solemn
pledge, was being used to guarantee revenue bonds for
non-essentials like solar-power projects, apartment
buildings and a soccer stadium -- things bailout weary
taxpayers might walk away from if the guarantees were
called.
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Legal restrictions to disclosing information should be based on
evident public interest and to be used reasonably.
And Implication 3 to Principle 11 explains:
Debtors should make public disclosure of their financial and
economic situation, providing among others the following
information: (i) accurate and timely fiscal data; (ii) level and
composition of external and domestic sovereign debt including
maturity, currency, and forms of indexation and covenants; (iii)
external accounts; (iv) the use of derivative instruments and
their actual market value; (v) amortization schedules and, (vi)
details of any kind of implicit and explicit sovereign guarantees.
Sovereign borrowers may wish to consider disclosing
information by way of international norms, such as the IMF’s
Special Data Dissemination Standard.5
The European Union Council issued a Directive in 2011 with
this text:
For all sub-sectors of general government,
Member States shall publish relevant information
on contingent liabilities with potentially large
impacts on public budgets, including government
guarantees, non-performing loans, and liabilities
stemming from the operation of public
corporations, including the extent thereof.
Member States shall also publish information on
the participation of general government in the
capital of private and public corporations in
respect of economically significant amounts.6
The Eurozone financial crisis that started in 2009 added a new
twist on the motivation for sovereign guarantees. Some of the Eurozone
peripheral countries like Greece began to experience heavy outflows of bank
deposits. The resources of the local central banks were unable to supply
adequate liquidity to the banking systems. The solution? Local banks would
5

UNCTAD, 2012 Principles on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing,
Principle 11 (Disclosure and Reporting), Implication 3 (emphasis added). Other principles
also touch upon the issue, such as Principle 4 (Responsible Credit Decisions), Implication 3
and Principle 13 (Adequate Management and Monitoring). The text of the Principles is
available at
http://www.unctad.info/upload/Debt%20Portal/Principles%20drafts/SLB_Principles_English_
Doha_22-04-2012.pdf
6

See Council Directive on 8 November 2011 on Requirements for Budgetary Frameworks of
the Member States (November 23, 2011, Article 14, Part 3).
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issue debt instruments to themselves, obtain a government guarantee and
then use the instruments as collateral for loans from the European Central
Bank. The sovereign guarantee in this context does not serve the
conventional purpose of persuading a creditor to lend to an otherwise creditimpaired debtor; after all, in these situations the creditor and the debtor are
the same entity -- the issuing bank. The guarantee is simply a passport into
the ECB discount window.7
The Challenge
The central problem with contingent liabilities is that they are
contingent. Neither the beneficiary of the guarantee (the creditor) nor the
sovereign guarantor will ordinarily know at the outset whether the primary
obligor (the borrower) will eventually be able to repay the debt on its own.8
Therein lies the challenge for the sovereign debt restructurer. If
one forces the beneficiary to call on the sovereign guarantee as a means of
bringing the liability into the main restructuring in order to treat it in a manner
identical to other debts, the sovereign may be taking on its own shoulders a
liability that, left on its own, would never have emerged from the cocoon of
contingency. Why? Because the primary obligor may have paid it at
maturity without government assistance.
Leaving large contingent liabilities out of the main debt
restructuring, however, may plant a land mine on the road to debt
sustainability once the restructuring closes. Is the restructurer to assume that
(i) some, (ii) all or (iii) none of those contingent liabilities will eventually wind
up as direct claims against the sovereign? The answer to that question may
dramatically affect whether the main debt restructuring will achieve its
primary aim of returning the country to a sustainable debt position.
For its part, the creditor/beneficiary of a state guarantee has a
right to feel more aggrieved about being dragged into a sovereign debt
7

See ECB Caps Use of State-Backed Bonds as Collateral, REUTERS, July 3, 2012, available
at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/07/03/uk-ecb-collateral-idUKBRE8620V920120703;
Sonia Sirletti & Elisa Martinussi, Italy Banks Said to Use State-Backed Bonds for ECB
Loans, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 21, 2011, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-1220/italian-banks-are-said-to-use-state-guaranteed-bonds-to-receive-ecb-loans.html
8

But sometimes they will know. In the Greek debt restructuring of 2012 described below, for
example, 36 bonds guaranteed by the Hellenic Republic (but only 36 out of hundreds of
state-guaranteed obligations) were declared eligible to participate in the restructuring of the
Republic’s debt. One criterion used in selecting these bonds was a general recognition that
the primary obligors did not have the capacity to service the debts out of their own
resources. For details on the Greek restructuring, including regarding the guaranteed
bonds, see Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch & Mitu Gulati, The Greek Debt
Exchange: An Autopsy (2012 draft), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144932
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restructuring than does a direct creditor of the State. The beneficiary of such
a guarantee by definition holds "two name paper"; the beneficiary enjoys the
credit of both the State and the primary obligor. By roping the beneficiary of
a State guarantee into a debt workout, the additional credit protection
resulting from the independent obligation of the primary obligor to pay the
debt is lost.
The Options
There are at least four possible ways of treating explicit
contingent liabilities in a debt restructuring of the sovereign:
1. Ignore them. Under this approach, the sovereign deals only with
guarantees that are actually called by the beneficiary before the debt
restructuring closes. No pressure is put on beneficiaries to call the
guarantees; no effort is made to force the liabilities into the
restructuring.
2. Entice them. The sovereign may declare that paper bearing its
guarantee will be eligible to be tendered in the restructuring
transaction. Naturally, this leaves it in the discretion of the holders
whether to tender now or wait and take their chances when the
scheduled maturity date of the paper arrives. The sovereign may
attempt to entice holders into the restructuring by offering them a
small premium over the consideration being offered to direct creditors.
Such a sweetner can be justified as the consideration paid to the
beneficiary of a State guarantee in return for the beneficiary’s release
of the primary obligor.
3. Pressure the beneficiaries to call. Careening to the other extreme, the
sovereign debtor could attempt to pressure the beneficiaries to call on
their State guarantees in order to bring the resulting -- now actual, no
longer contingent -- liabilities into the sovereign’s debt restructuring.
Presumably, this could only be done by threatening to repudiate any
post-closing call of the guarantee. In the case of guarantees that are
governed by the law of the sovereign’s own jurisdiction (and our
research suggests that a surprising number of Eurozone sovereign
guarantees specify local law for the guarantee even where the
underlying instrument is governed by foreign law), pressure can be
applied by passing a law mandating the terms on which the guarantee
will be settled.
4. Call or don't call; you will receive the same consideration. The fourth
option is to tell beneficiaries that they are free to call or not as they
choose, but if they elect to call on the State guarantee after the debt
restructuring closes, the sovereign will honor it by delivering
consideration having a net present value equal to what the creditor
6
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would have received had the claim been brought into the main
restructuring.
The Problems
Each of these options has its own set of problems.
Leaving the guarantees out of a restructuring altogether
(Option 1) places the sovereign at risk that the financial predicates
underlying the debt restructuring could be undone. A large slug of liabilities
coming onto the balance sheet of the sovereign unexpectedly in the future
could render obsolete the debt sustainability analysis upon which the
financial terms of the main restructuring was based. This is a risk both to the
sovereign debtor and to the other creditors that join the restructuring.9
But forcing the beneficiaries to call on the explicit guarantees
(Option 4), even if legally possible (which it probably won't be), compels the
beneficiaries to give up their claims on the primary obligors. As noted
above, this works a special hardship on guaranteed creditors in comparison
with their direct creditor counterparts.
Enticing the beneficiaries to join the restructuring by offering
them a sweetner (Option 2) may bring in some of the beneficiaries, but
probably not all of them unless the sweetener is embarrassingly sweet.

9

The existence of guarantees that pop up after a debt restructuring has closed can be an
embarrassment, or worse, for the debtor country. This happened in Belize shortly after that
country’s debt restructuring closed in 2007. See Belize Bank: A $10 m Mystery, THE
ECONOMIST, May 15, 2008, available at http://www.economist.com/node/11377008. A
heated scandal ensued. Local activists in Belize sought to block payments on the guarantee
(which had quickly become direct obligations of the sovereign because the underlying
obligor was unable to pay). The creditor, Belize Bank, however, took the position that it was
entitled to full payment and the Government subsequently conceded this in arbitration
proceedings in the United Kingdom.
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Finally, telling beneficiaries that they will receive the same
consideration in settlement of their guarantees regardless of when they may
call on those guarantees (Option 3) may not be a credible threat. If things
begin to improve in the debtor country after the restructuring closes, will the
government really be eager to default on an item of guaranteed debt soon
thereafter? Probably not.
The Practice
There has been no consistent practice in previous sovereign
debt restructurings on this issue. The workouts of commercial bank
sovereign loans in the 1980s generally followed Option 1 above.
Beneficiaries were not required, nor even encouraged, to call on their
sovereign guarantees.10
In its 2012 debt restructuring, Greece invited, but did not
attempt to coerce, holders of a small segment of State guaranteed debt to
participate in the restructuring (Option 2). See “The Greek Case” below.
When the Highly Indebted Poor Country initiative got under way
in the mid 1990s, the HIPC rules required that all contingent liabilities of the
debtor countries be brought into the settlement (Option 3). To our
knowledge, however, the HIPC rules did not confide to the sovereign debtors
how they were to achieve this if a creditor/beneficiary simply declined the
offer.
At least one country has chosen Option 4 (promise equal
treatment of the creditor whenever the guarantee may be called). Grenada,
in its debt restructuring of 2005, had outstanding government guarantees in
an amount equal to 10% of the country’s total stock of debt. Grenada could
not legally force the beneficiaries to call on the guarantees, but it did
expressly warn the beneficiaries that they should expect no better treatment
if they elected to stay out of the restructuring and call on the guarantee after
the restructuring closed. As described in a 2006 article:

10

The telex sent by Mexico addressed to “The International Banking Community” on
December 8, 1982 (at the very beginning of the global debt crisis of the 1980s) contained
draft “Restructure Principles”. The debt subject to the restructuring referred to principal
maturities falling due within a specified time period, “but, in the case of any Debt which
arises from a guarantee, endorsement, aval or similar instrument, only such payment
obligations which are invoked and payable” during that time period. This practice appears to
have been followed by the other sovereign debt restructurings of that era.
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Grenada’s solution to this dilemma had three
elements11:
● Beneficiaries of all government guarantees
were given the option to call upon their
guarantees at any time prior to the expiration date
of the [restructuring exchange] offer. The face
amount of any guarantee called by a beneficiary
would then be exchanged, at par, for the new
bonds being issued in the exchange.
● A beneficiary calling a guarantee in these
circumstances was required to subrogate the
Government to all of the beneficiary’s claims
against the primary obligor and any collateral
securing the debt of the underlying project.
● If a beneficiary elected not to call on a
government guarantee during the offer period,
however, the disclosure document for the
exchange warned that any subsequent call on the
guarantee would be discharged by the delivery to
the beneficiary of the same bonds being issued in
the exchange on terms comparable to those
reflected in the exchange offer (or, at the
Government’s option, by delivery of other
consideration having an equivalent value).
The Greek Case
In the spring of 2012, the Hellenic Republic restructured
approximately €206 billion of its bond indebtedness in the hands of private
sector creditors, the largest sovereign debt restructuring in history. More
than 130 separate series of bonds were declared eligible to participate in this
restructuring including 36 series of bonds bearing the express guarantee of
the Hellenic Republic. The Hellenic Republic offered no special
compensation (over and above the consideration offered to holders of direct
Hellenic Republic bonds) to the holders of guaranteed bonds in return for the
surrender of the holders’ claims against the primary obligors, nor were any
contractual measures taken to coerce the holders of the guaranteed bonds
into participating in the transaction.

11

See Lee C. Buchheit & Elizabeth Karpinski, Grenada’s Innovations, 4 J. INT’L BANKING AND
REG. 227, 231 (2006).
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At the time of this debt restructuring, the Hellenic Republic had
put its guarantee on hundreds of outstanding debt instruments (loans and
bonds), but only 36 were declared eligible to participate in the 2012
restructuring. One of the criteria used by the Republic to select these 36
series of bonds was their classification by Eurostat (the statistical office of
the European Union) as “central government debt” for Eurostat reporting
purposes.
Preventive Measures
What preventive measures could a sovereign take to deal with
this problem? One possible step would be for the sovereign to insert into its
standard form of guarantee a contractual provision to the effect that the
guarantee will be deemed automatically called (or will be callable at the
option of the sovereign guarantor) in the event of the announcement of a
generalized debt restructuring by the sovereign. We have never seen such a
provision, however, and we doubt whether it would be well received by
prospective beneficiaries of the guarantees.
Alternatively, a sovereign could attempt to preserve the
economics of “two-name paper” by telling a beneficiary who joins the
sovereign’s debt restructuring that if the exercise by the sovereign of its
subrogation rights against the primary obligor produces a recovery after the
restructuring closes, the proceeds of that recovery will be paid first to the
beneficiary up to the amount of the financial loss it realized by joining the
restructuring, and thereafter to the sovereign. The exercise of these
subrogation rights, however, ought logically to be placed in the hands of a
third party such as a trustee. The sovereign cannot be trusted to pursue the
primary obligor aggressively (particularly if it is a state-owned enterprise),
while the beneficiary would have no economic incentive to pursue a primary
obligor to recover anything more than the beneficiary itself could claim as its
make-whole amount.
A third option would be for the sovereign to include in its
guarantees some form of collective action clause that would permit a
supermajority of the beneficiaries of that guarantee to agree to a settlement
of the guarantee as part of the sovereign’s main debt restructuring. A
decision taken pursuant to such a collective action clause would then bind
any dissenting beneficiaries of the guarantee.
*

*

*

*
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